The subjective impression that one situation is similar to another situation. People often judge probability by the degree to which A resembles B. In other words, when aspects of a situation seem similar to those of another situation, they are more likely to predict that they will show similar responses to change. They do this even when they believe that the similar characteristics are irrelevant. Tversky and Kahneman (1982) use the following example to reveal this tendency:
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear
demonstrations. Please check off the most likely alternative:
□ Linda is a bank teller.
□ Linda is a bank
teller and is active in the feminist movement.”
Nearly 90% of the subjects (n = 86) thought
that Linda was more likely to be a bank teller and a feminist than to be
a bank teller. Representativeness can create problems in using
expert opinions or
intentions surveys. It is useful
in writing scenarios. See
conjunction fallacy.
- Tversky, A. & D. Kahneman (1982), “Judgments of and
by representativeness,” in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (eds.),
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.